Emotions & reasons : an inquiry into emotional justification /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Greenspan, Patricia S., 1944-
Imprint:New York : Routledge, 1988.
Description:x, 197 p. ; 23 cm.
Subject:Emotions (Philosophy)
Emotions (Philosophy)
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/924189
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other title:Emotions and reasons.
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Review by Choice Review

The emotions have been relatively neglected by philosophers. The questions that have received most attention include whether emotions are sensations or judgments, whether all emotions have objects, and whether the objects of emotions are their causes. There have also been some attempts at analyzing particular emotions. Greenspan (University of Maryland) here explores the relations between thought, judgment, emotion, and action. She seeks to counter the tendency of many philosophers to dismiss the affective aspect of emotion. The author's view is that "emotions, conceived as comfort or discomfort directed towards evaluative propositions, may sometimes be rationally required, as motivational supplements to belief. But. . .unless an emotion is practically adaptive in {{a}} particular case. . .there is no reason--apart from moral obligations and the like--why one ought to feel it instead of simply holding in mind its propositional content without affect." This book is not a systematic theory of the emotions. It does not canvas the relevant literature. Nevertheless, it is a valuable contribution that opens up new questions and provides interesting insights into old issues. Recommended for all upper-division and graduate libraries. -D. Jamieson, University of Colorado at Boulder

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review