Incentives for reporting infectious disease outbreaks /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Malani, Anup, author.
Imprint:[Chicago, Illinois] : Law School, University of Chicago, 2009.
Description:1 online resource (29 pages)
Language:English
Series:John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper ; no. 487 (2d series)
John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics working paper ; 2nd ser., no. 487.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8933899
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Varying Form of Title:Incentives for surveillance of infectious disease outbreaks
Other authors / contributors:Laxminarayan, Ramanan, author.
Notes:"September 1, 2009."
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from online title page (viewed November 20, 2012).
Summary:"This paper examines the incentives for countries to report disease outbreaks such as swine flu, avian flu and SARS to the international community. Even cursory analysis suggests countries have conflicting incentives regarding whether to report an outbreak. Reporting an outbreak may bring medical assistance, but also trigger trade sanctions to contain an outbreak. Modeling the decision as a signaling game where a country has private but imperfect evidence of an outbreak provides additional insights. First, not all sanctions discourage reporting. Sanctions based on fears of an undetected outbreak (false negatives) encourage disclosure by reducing the relative cost of sanctions that follow a reported outbreak. Second, improving the quality of detection technology may not promote the disclosure of private information about an outbreak because more informative reports could also trigger harsher sanctions. Third, informal surveillance - an important channel for publicizing outbreaks - functions as an exogenous, public signal that is less likely to discourage disclosure than better technology. Informal surveillance can counter false positive and false negative formal disclosures, reducing the relative sanctions for disclosing an outbreak."

MARC

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245 1 0 |a Incentives for reporting infectious disease outbreaks /  |c Anup Malani and Ramanan Laxminarayan. 
246 3 |a Incentives for surveillance of infectious disease outbreaks 
264 1 |a [Chicago, Illinois] :  |b Law School, University of Chicago,  |c 2009. 
300 |a 1 online resource (29 pages) 
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490 1 |a John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper ;  |v no. 487 (2d series) 
500 |a "September 1, 2009." 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references. 
520 |a "This paper examines the incentives for countries to report disease outbreaks such as swine flu, avian flu and SARS to the international community. Even cursory analysis suggests countries have conflicting incentives regarding whether to report an outbreak. Reporting an outbreak may bring medical assistance, but also trigger trade sanctions to contain an outbreak. Modeling the decision as a signaling game where a country has private but imperfect evidence of an outbreak provides additional insights. First, not all sanctions discourage reporting. Sanctions based on fears of an undetected outbreak (false negatives) encourage disclosure by reducing the relative cost of sanctions that follow a reported outbreak. Second, improving the quality of detection technology may not promote the disclosure of private information about an outbreak because more informative reports could also trigger harsher sanctions. Third, informal surveillance - an important channel for publicizing outbreaks - functions as an exogenous, public signal that is less likely to discourage disclosure than better technology. Informal surveillance can counter false positive and false negative formal disclosures, reducing the relative sanctions for disclosing an outbreak." 
588 |a Title from online title page (viewed November 20, 2012). 
650 0 |a Communicable diseases  |x Reporting. 
650 0 |a Communicable diseases  |x Control  |x International cooperation. 
650 0 |a Communication in public health.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2004007172 
650 7 |a Communicable diseases  |x Reporting.  |2 fast  |0 http://id.worldcat.org/fast/fst00869916 
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