One-sided contracts in competitive consumer markets /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Bebchuk, Lucian A., author.
Imprint:	[Chicago, Illinois] : Law School, University of Chicago, 2005.
Description:	1 online resource (15 pages)
Language:	English
Series:	John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper ; no. 270 (2d series) John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics working paper ; 2nd ser., no. 270.
Subject:	Contracts -- Interpretation and construction. Contracts -- Economic aspects. Contracts -- Economic aspects. Contracts -- Interpretation and construction.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8902642

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Other authors / contributors:	Posner, Richard A., author.
Notes:	"December 2005." Includes bibliographical references. Title from online title page (viewed September 4, 2012).
Summary:	"This paper shows that 'one-sided' terms in standard contracts, which deny consumers a contractual benefit that seems efficient on average, may arise in competitive markets without informational problems (other than those of courts). A onesided term might be an efficient response to situations in which courts cannot perfectly observe all the contingencies needed for an accurate implementation of a 'balanced' contractual term when firms are more concerned about their reputation, and thus less inclined to behave opportunistically, than consumers are. We develop this explanation, discuss its positive and normative implications, and compare them to those of informationbased explanations for one-sided terms."

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