Responsibility for justice /

Young (formerly, Univ. of Chicago), who died before finishing this book, distinguishes guilt, a largely backward-looking individualized conception, from responsibility, a shared, forward-looking idea that emphasizes social connection and mutual interdependence in complex societies. Many conservatives deny the existence of social structural injustice and collective responsibility for large-scale processes that systematically disadvantage many people. Young persuasively disagrees. The poor have responsibilities, but solving their problems requires government and group solutions. In addressing problems like persistent poverty, inequality, inadequate schools, vulnerability, and group concentration in low-paying positions and bad housing, collective responsibility is a broader, more plausible conception than individualized guilt and laying blame in terms of personal laziness, consistently bad decisions, and natural inferiority. It acknowledges degrees of responsibility for undesirable or unjust outcomes that are not due to legal culpability or individual transgression of rules, laws, or norms: contributing to a climate of opinion, personally benefitting from inequality, going about one's normal and legal business, legal pursuit of self-interest, or taking advantage of opportunities have unintended consequences that may reduce opportunities and possibilities for those who are less favorably situated. Perceptive readers can easily provide numerous examples from current headlines. Summing Up: Recommended. General readers; upper-division undergraduate students and above. C. P. Waligorski emeritus, University of Arkansas