Death and mortality in contemporary philosophy /
Saved in:
Author / Creator: | Schumacher, Bernard N. |
---|---|
Edition: | Rev. English ed. |
Imprint: | Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2010. |
Description: | xi, 258 p. |
Language: | English |
Subject: | |
Format: | E-Resource Book |
URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8209891 |
Table of Contents:
- Preface
- Introduction
- Part 1. Human Personal Death
- 1. Definitions of Death and What We Mean by Person
- Introduction
- Biological Death
- So-called Personal Death
- The Anthropological Challenge of Neocortical Death
- Ethics as the Criterion for Defining Death
- Diversity of Definitions of Death in a Secular Ethic
- Conclusion
- Part 2. Theory of Knowledge About Death
- 2. Scheler's Intuitive Knowledge of Mortality
- Introduction
- Modern Man's Attitude Towards Death Itself
- The Certainty of Mortality Based on Observation and Induction or on Intuition
- Problematic Questions Raised by Scheler's Thesis of an Intuitive Knowledge of Mortality
- 3. Heidegger's Being-Towards-Death
- The Distinction Between Ontical and Ontological
- The Impossibility of Experiencing My Own Death
- The Death of Another as a Possible Object of Thanatological Knowledge
- Being-Towards-Death
- Critique
- 4. Is Mortality the Object of Foreknowledge?
- 5. Inductive Knowledge of Death and Jean-Paul Sartre
- The Realist and Idealist Concepts of Death
- The Expectation of My Death
- Death as Another's Victory
- Death as a Situation-limit
- Conclusion
- 6. Knowledge of Mortality Is Inseparable from the Relation to the Other
- 7. Death as the Object of Experience
- Mutual Exclusiveness of the States of Life and Death
- The Meaning of the Expression "My Death"
- Death in Life
- Love as the Unveiling of What Is Unthinkable about Death
- The Phenomenology of Death
- Part 3. Does Death Mean Nothing to Us?
- 8. The "Nothingness of Death": Epicurus and His Followers
- Presuppositions of the Epicurean Thesis of the "Nothingness of Death": Materialism, Hedonism, and Experientialism
- "Death Is Nothing to Us"
- The Ancients
- Modern Thinkers: Montaigne, Feuerbach, Schopenhauer, and Others
- 9. Discussion of Experientialism and the Need for a Subject
- The a Priori Character of the Epicurean Assertion the Death Is Nothing to Us
- First Series of Examples Against Experientialism: Comparisons Between Two States of Life
- Second Series of Examples Against Experientialism: Comparisons Between a State of Life and a State of Death
- Third Set of Possible Arguments Against Experientialism: Posthumous Evils
- The Subject of Posthumous Evils
- 10. Death: An Evil of Privation
- Of What Does Death Deprive the Subject?
- Is Death Always an Evil?
- Defense of the Characterization of Death as an Evil in View of the Peaceful State of Prenatal Nonexistence
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index of Names
- Index of Concepts