Bibliographic Details

Hannibal : Rome's greatest enemy / Dexter Hoyos.

Author / Creator Hoyos, B. D. (B. Dexter), 1944-
Imprint Exeter : Bristol Phoenix Press, 2008.
Description xix, 163 p. : ill., maps ; 23 cm.
Language English
Series Greece and Rome live
Greece and Rome live.
Subject Hannibal, 247 B.C.-182 B.C.
Hannibal, 247 B.C.-182 B.C. -- Military leadership.
Hannibal, 247 B.C.-182 B.C.
Generals -- Tunisia -- Carthage (Extinct city)
Command of troops.
Carthage (Extinct city)
Rome -- History -- Republic, 265-30 B.C.
Rome (Empire)
Tunisia -- Carthage (Extinct city)
Format Print, Book
URL for this record
ISBN 9781904675464 (cased)
1904675468 (cased)
1904675476 (pbk.)
9781904675471 (pbk.)
Notes Includes bibliographical references (p. [151]-156) and index.
Summary From the Publisher: Hannibal's enduring reputation as a man and as a general is due to his enemies' fascination with him. The way his legend was shaped in the Greek and Roman consciousness is one of the book's main themes. Under Hannibal's leadership, Carthage came close to dominating the western Mediterranean; his total victory would have changed the course of history. That he was a brilliant general is unquestioned, and his strategy and tactics have been studied as real-life lessons in war, even into the modern era. His political career is less appreciated and his achievements as civilian leader of Carthage in 196-5 BC have been virtually overlooked. The issue of whether he might indeed have changed history had he postponed conflict with Rome and concentrated first on Carthage's own prosperity and safety is explored in this volume as vigorously as the military questions.
Review by Choice Review

Hannibal has been generally seen as a military genius who fought against impossible odds. Hoyos (emer., Univ. of Sydney) marvels at Hannibal's ability to create a multicultural army and train good officers, and compares him to Alexander. He faults him, however, for allowing the Romans to cut off his reinforcements from Spain, for not deploying Fabian tactics in Africa, and, finally, for allowing Scipio to outgeneral him at Zama. Despite the paucity of evidence, Hoyos argues persuasively that Hannibal was a cultured man, loyal to friends and fond of women. Although he controlled the popular vote in Carthage, he was not a democrat. Hoyos thinks Hannibal could have defeated Rome and created a Punic Empire had he not made several crucial mistakes. This would not have been a disaster for the Mediterranean World, for Carthage had become Hellenized and thus would have been a reasonable hegemonic power. Hoyos, who has published scholarly books on the subject (e.g. Truceless War, CH, Jul'08, 45-6337; Hannibal's Dynasty, CH, Dec'03, 41-2328), does not cite any secondary works. He writes clearly, but the lack of maps hampers his discussion of military operations, particularly the battles of Cannae and Zama. This is an excellent book for nonspecialists. Summing Up: Highly recommended. General, public, and undergraduate collections. A. J. Papalas East Carolina University

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review