Virtue ethics : a pluralistic view /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Swanton, Christine, 1947-
Imprint:Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2003.
Description:xi, 312 p. ; 23 cm.
Format: E-Resource Print Book
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Varying Form of Title:Virtue ethics
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (p. [297]-308) and index.
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Standard no.:9780199253883
Review by Choice Review

Swanton (Univ. of Auckland) presents here her pluralistic virtue ethics as an alternative to the dominant views of Kantianism and consequentialism. She also rejects the neo-Aristotelian type of virtue ethics, but looks to Aristotle and Nietzsche as her prime inspirations, while making wide use of contemporary analytic philosophy, other virtue ethicists, psychoanalysis, and sociology. Besides explaining her view of the nature of virtue and of virtue ethics and how it provides a more adequate manner of solving moral problems, Swanton discusses extensively the various modes of moral acknowledgment found in virtues. She also criticizes various other virtue ethicists when their views do not square with hers. Thus, she provides patient readers with both an overall view of the moral issue and a detailed presentation of her own position. Avoiding technical language, she works out a well-constructed and clear exposition, which will appeal to anyone interested in moral theory. Her book contrasts with Julia Driver's Uneasy Virtue (2001), which is a brief and readable defense of consequentialism. For larger libraries supporting philosophy as a major. ^BSumming Up: Recommended. General readers; upper-level undergraduates and above. G. J. Dalcourt emeritus, Seton Hall University

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review