Hilary Putnam : realism, reason, and the uses of uncertainty /

Norris (Cardiff Univ., UK) distinguishes three Putnams, each deserving careful scrutiny. The first Putnam defended scientific realism and natural kinds, earning Norris's approval. The second Putnam, emerging after his 1975 repudiation of metaphysical realism for internal realism, permitted relativistic arguments (Wittgenstein, Goodman), quantum mechanics (the Copenhagen interpretation), and verificationism (Dummett) to overthrow scientific realism. The third post-1994 Putnam has been gradually returning to realism, although Norris does not see sufficient progress and offers little discussion of his most recent writings. Putnam's important work in the philosophy of mind is largely ignored in favor of placing his struggles with scientific realism at center stage. This focus distorts Norris's otherwise sound exposition, which overzealously defends the first Putnam's scientific realism. Norris's Putnams are tragic figures: the value in Putnam's pre-1975 thought has been largely vitiated by his abandonment of metaphysical realism and hence scientific realism. Likewise, his surrender to relativistic arguments in the philosophy of logic and mathematics casts him adrift between Platonic realism and empiricist nominalism. Despite Norris's somewhat one-sided and partisan stance, this book is the best available full-length discussion of Putnam's career. ^BSumming Up: Recommended. Upper-level undergraduates through researchers. J. R. Shook Oklahoma State University