Foundations of corporate law /
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| Imprint: | New York : Oxford University Press, 1993. |
|---|---|
| Description: | 328 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Interdisciplinary readers in law Interdisciplinary readers in law |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/1549197 |
Table of Contents:
- I. Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets Theory of the Firm Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure
- Meckling Transaction Cost Economics
- Ownership of the Firm, Henry Hansmann Notes and Questions
- Theory of Capital Markets From a Random Walk Down Wall Street
- From Corporate Finance
- Notes and Questions
- II. Legal Characteristics of the Corporation: Limited Liability Limited Liability and the Corporation
- Fischel Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm
- Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts
- Kraakman Notes and Questions
- III. The Production of Corporate Laws State Competition for Corporate Charters
- The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, Roberta Romano Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law
- Notes and Questions
- The Structure of Corporation Laws The Corporate Contract
- The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law
- The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role
- Notes and Questions
- IV. Financing the Corporation On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants
- Contractual Resolution of Bondholder-Stockholder Conflicts in Leveraged Buyouts
- Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy
- The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations
- Two Agency Cost Explanations of Dividends
- Notes and Questions
- V. Internal Governance Structures Boards of Directors and Fiduciary Duties Corporate Governance
- Incentive and Tax Effects of Executive Compensation Plans
- The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?
- Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law
- Notes and Questions Shareholder Voting Rights and the Exercise of Voice Voting in Corporate Law
- Easterbrook and
- Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice
- Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight
- A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance
- Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice
- Active Investors, LBO's and the Privatization of Bankruptcy
- Notes and Questions
- VI. External Governance Structures
- The Market for Corporate Control Theories and Evidence Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
- Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences
- Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers
- Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers
- The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers
- The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence