Estimative intelligence : the purposes and problems of national intelligence estimating /
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| Author / Creator: | Ford, Harold P., 1921-2010 |
|---|---|
| Edition: | Rev. ed. |
| Imprint: | Lanham : University Press of America ; [Washington, DC] : Defense Intelligence College, c1993. |
| Description: | x, 341 p. ; 24 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/1428906 |
Table of Contents:
- Sect. I. What Is National Estimating? Ch. 1. The Primary Purpose of National Estimating: To Avoid Another Pearl Harbor-type Surprise. The First Pearl Harbor: The Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) of 4 December 1941 [Excerpts]. The 4 December 1941 SNIE in retrospect. Negative factors present in the situation of 1941 which prevented a more effective alerting of U.S. Commanders. The relevance of the 1941 SNIE for present questions of U.S. intelligence and policymaking. Ch. 2. National Intelligence Estimates and National Estimating. The significance for national estimating of subsequent Pearl Harbors. How does "national estimating" differ from the preparing of National Intelligence Estimates? Suggested exercise: Preparing the Key Questions (or the Key Judgments) of a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE)
- Sect. II. The Evolution of National Intelligence Estimating
- And the Lessons to Be Learned from This Experience. Ch. 3. The Evolution of Estimates Prior to the Korean War. Ch. 4. National Estimating and the Korean War. The chronology of poor intelligence performance concerning Korea. The significance for us of this experience. Ch. 5. The Development of National Estimating Since the Korean War. The first phase: NIEs and SNIEs produced by the Office of National Estimates (O/NE) and the Intelligence Community, 1950-1973. The strengths of O/NE were many, especially in its earlier years. The principal causes of O/NE's later demise. The second phase of national estimating: the Korean War: The National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) 1973-1980. The third phase of national intelligence estimating: National Intelligence Council, 1980 to date
- Sect. III. The Present System of National Estimating. Ch. 6. The National Intelligence Council (NIC). The NIC
- Its makeup and the responsibilities. The types of national estimates produced. The making of National Intelligence Estimates. Suggested class exercise. Ch. 7. The Contribution of other (non-NIC) agencies to national intelligence estimating. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The military services and national estimating. The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
- Sect. IV. Tomorrow's Estimative Needs. Ch. 8. National Estimating Must Make Impact on the Policymaking Consumers of Intelligence. Hazards in the relationships between producers and consumers of national intelligence estimating. Suggested class exercise. Ch. 9. National Estimating and Tomorrow's World. Tomorrow's likely world. The significance of tomorrow's world for national estimating. Recommendations for improving national estimating and its impact on policymaking consumers. I. The Bomber and Missile Gaps. [Chapter 3 (pp. 46-69) of Brinkley & Hull's Estimative Intelligence]
- II. Intelligence and the Middle East (Yom Kippur) War of 1973. [Chapter 4 (pp. 70-87) of Brinkley & Hull]
- III. The A - B Team Experiment in Competitive Estimating. 1976. [Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1978]
- IV. Intelligence and the Fall of the Shah in Iran, 1978-1979. [Staff Report of the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 1979]
- V. Robert M. Gates, "The CIA and American Foreign Policy." [Foreign Affairs (Winter 1987/88), pp. 215-230]
- VI. Hans Heymann, "Intelligence/Policy Relationships." [Chapter in Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall, and James M. Keagle (eds.), Intelligence: Policy and Process (Westview Press, 1985), pp. 57-66].