Review by Choice Review
Arguing that death is not just the cessation of life, Feldman opposes both those philosophers who claim death cannot be evil and those who, explaining it in biological terms, claim death is not mysterious. Though conceding he cannot come to a satisfactory philosophical analysis of death, Feldman places death within a general conceptual scheme by which he counters the arguments of Epicurius and Lucretius that death is a misfortune to the individual who dies. Feldman makes the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value to the person; and his central thesis resurrects a form of "deprivation theory": death may in special instances be extrinsically bad, or in some cases good, depending on whether death cuts short potential happiness. Feldman extends this deprivation approach by means of a utilitarian argument contending that suicide, abortion, or euthanasia may be permissible under circumstances where life as a whole, if continued, would be worse than if the person had died. Though not wholly unique, the theses are succinctly formulated, closely and capably argued in terse style. Nevertheless an implicit and larger question implied by the title of the book is not answered: Feldman never spells out whether his materialist method offers a satisfactory way of "confronting" death. Eric Cassell's review (The Hastings Center Report, April 1984) gives a similar criticism of the method of linguistic analysis in Jay F. Rosenberg's Thinking Clearly About Death (1983). J. M. Boyle; Dowling College
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review
