Managerial dilemmas : the political economy of hierarchy /
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| Author / Creator: | Miller, Gary J. |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1992. |
| Description: | xv, 254 p. ; 24 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Political economy of institutions and decisions |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/1266857 |
Table of Contents:
- List of tables and figures
- Series editors' preface
- Acknowledgements
- Part I. Why Have Hierarchy?
- 1. Market failures and hierarchical solutions: the tension between individual and social rationality
- 2. Bargaining failure: coordination, bargaining, and contracts
- 3. Voting failure: social choice in a dictatorial hierarchy
- Part II. Managerial Dilemmas
- 4. Horizontal dilemmas: social choice in a decentralised hierarchy
- 5. Vertical dilemmas: piece-rate incentives and credible commitments
- 6. Hidden action in hierarchies: principals, agents, and teams
- 7. Hidden information in hierarchies: the logical limits of mechanism design
- 8. Hierarchical failures and market solutions: can competition create efficient incentives for managers?
- Part III. Cooperation and Leadership
- 9. The possibilities of cooperation: repeated vertical dilemmas
- 10. The indeterminacy of cooperation: conventions, culture, and commitments
- 11. The political economy of hierarchy: commitment, leadership and property rights
- Epilogue: politics, rationality, and efficiency
- References
- Name index
- Subject index