Bank risk-taking and competition revisited : new theory and new evidence /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Boyd, John H., author.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2006.
Description:1 online resource (49 pages) : illustrations.
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/06/297
IMF working paper ; WP/06/297.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12495600
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:De Nicoló, Gianni, author.
Jalal, Abu M., author.
International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
ISBN:1283450399
9781283450393
Digital file characteristics:data file
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 48-49).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
Summary:This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend.
Other form:Print version: Boyd, John H. Bank risk-taking and competition revisited. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2006