Optimal Tax Administration /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Keen, Michael, author.
Imprint:Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2017.
Description:1 online resource (28 pages)
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/17/8
IMF working paper ; WP/17/8.
Subject:Tax administration and procedure.
Taxpayer compliance.
Tax administration and procedure.
Taxpayer compliance.
Electronic books.
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12350276
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Slemrod, Joel, author.
ISBN:1475570376
1475570260
9781475570267
9781475570373
Notes:References.
Print version record.
Summary:This paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration, one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy. Its key contribution is the development of a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions-the "enforcement elasticity of tax revenue"--That is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions, much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates. Amongst the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures, and of the optimal compliance gap.
Other form:Print version: Keen, Michael. Optimal Tax Administration. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2017 9781475570267
Standard no.:10.5089/9781475570267.001