Voting procedures under a restricted domain : an examination of the (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to five main paradoxes /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Felsenthal, Dan S., author.
Imprint:Cham, Switzerland : Springer, [2019]
Description:1 online resource (x, 92 pages)
Language:English
Series:SpringerBriefs in economics
SpringerBriefs in economics.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11873434
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Nurmi, Hannu, author.
ISBN:9783030126278
3030126277
9783030126285
3030126285
Digital file characteristics:text file PDF
Notes:Includes bibliographical references.
Description based on online resource; title from resource home page (ProQuest Ebook Central, viewed February 23, 2021).
Summary:"This book deals with 20 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid five important paradoxes in a restricted domain, viz., when a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in the initial profile. Together with the two companion volumes by the same authors, published by Springer in 2017 and 2018, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of voting procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes."--ProQuest website.
Other form:Print version: Felsenthal, Dan S. Voting procedures under a restricted domain. Cham, Switzerland : Springer, [2019] 3030126269 9783030126261
Standard no.:10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8