Identification and Inference in First-Price Auctions with Collusion /
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| Author / Creator: | Schurter, Karl Edward, author. |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | 2017. Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 |
| Description: | 1 electronic resource (111 pages) |
| Language: | English |
| Format: | E-Resource Dissertations |
| Local Note: | School code: 0330 |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11715039 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Schurter, Karl Edward, |e author. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Identification and Inference in First-Price Auctions with Collusion / |c Karl Edward Schurter. |
| 260 | |c 2017. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Ann Arbor : |b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, |c 2017 | |
| 300 | |a 1 electronic resource (111 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent |0 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/contentTypes/txt | ||
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| 500 | |a Advisors: Ali Hortacsu Committee members: Brent Hickman; Azeem Shaikh. | ||
| 502 | |b Ph.D. |c University of Chicago, Division of the Social Sciences, Department of Economics |d 2017. | ||
| 506 | |a This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. | ||
| 510 | 4 | |a Dissertation Abstracts International, |c Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A. | |
| 520 | |a This dissertation develops a method to detect collusion and estimate its effect on the seller's revenue in first-price auctions with independent, private valuations. The challenge is that collusion may be difficult to detect because colluders can use a simple and costless strategy to make their bids appear competitive. If the econometrician observes an exogenous shifter of the level of competition in the auction in addition to the winning bids, a statistical test for collusion by a given bidder can be formulated as a test of independence between the exogenous shifter and the valuations that rationalize its bids under the null hypothesis that it is not colluding. Simulations confirm this test performs well even when colluders attempt to disguise their behavior. I then adopt a multiple hypothesis testing framework to simultaneously test for collusion bidder by bidder. By controlling the probability of making one or more type I errors, the set of rejected hypotheses serves as a lower confidence bound on the set of colluders. To produce a lower confidence bound on the cost of collusion, I use consistent estimates of the bidders' valuation distributions to numerically solve for the seller's expected revenues in auctions with and without collusion. To provide an example of this identification strategy, I use exogenous variation in the reserve prices at British Columbia's timber auctions to estimate the extent of collusion in the years preceding a lumber trade dispute between the United States and Canada. | ||
| 546 | |a English | ||
| 590 | |a School code: 0330 | ||
| 690 | |a Economics. | ||
| 690 | |a Statistics. | ||
| 710 | 2 | |a University of Chicago. |e degree granting institution. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n79058404 |1 http://viaf.org/viaf/143657677 | |
| 720 | 1 | |a Ali Hortacsu |e degree supervisor. | |
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