Corruption and Decentralization: Does Country Size Matter for Interjurisdictional Competition? /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Cloutier, Mathieu, author.
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017
Description:1 electronic resource (62 pages)
Format: E-Resource Dissertations
Local Note:School code: 0330
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Other authors / contributors:University of Chicago. degree granting institution.
Notes:Advisors: Luigi Zingales Committee members: Erik Hurst; Roger Myerson.
Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.
Summary:The empirical evidence on whether decentralization can reduce corruption in developing countries is mixed. This paper proposes that the benefits of decentralization are conditional on the number of jurisdictions competing to attract mobile firms. I use firm level data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys and instrumental variables to show that decentralization in countries with a large number of regions reduces bribes paid to public officials. To examine this issue, I build a model of horizontal competition for public goods and bring some predictions of this model to the data. Finally, I calibrate the model to a case study of a very large and centralized country: Nigeria. According to the calibrated model, decentralization in Nigeria could reduce the bribes paid to public officials by 17% which could lead to a 4.7% growth of the firms' production.