The regulation of systemically relevant banks : how governments should manage their exposure to banking system risk /
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| Author / Creator: | Moenninghoff, Sebastian C., author. |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | Wiesbaden, Germany : SpringerGabler, [2018] |
| Description: | 1 online resource (xvi, 170 pages) |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Finanzwirtschaft, Banken und Bankmanagement = Finance, banks and bank management Finance, banks and bank management. |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | E-Resource Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11706479 |
Table of Contents:
- Intro; Foreword; Preface; Table of Contents; List of Abbreviations; List of Figures; List of Tables; 1. Introduction; 2. Consequences of Government Guarantees for Banks
- A Survey of the TBTF Doctrine; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Surveys of Government Guarantees for Banks; 2.3 TBTF as a Consequence of Government Guarantees; 2.3.1 Consequences of government guarantees; 2.3.2 The logic of the TBTF doctrine; 2.3.3 Alternative theories in the context of government guarantees for banks; 2.3.4 Empirical approaches to measuring the prevalence of TBTF; 2.4 Government Exposure and Subsidies
- 2.4.1 Contingent claims approach and absolute subsidy estimates2.4.2 Funding advantages based on contingent claims approach and rating-implied spreads; 2.4.3 Costs of past rescue measures; 2.4.4 Summary of empirical evidence of government exposure and subsidies; 2.5 Competitive Distortions from Government Guarantees; 2.5.1 Dimensions of competitive distortions; 2.5.2 Empirical approaches to measure guarantee-return relationships; 2.5.3 Empirical evidence of competitive distortions; 2.5.3.1 Competitive distortions by individual institution systemic relevance
- 2.5.3.2 Competitive distortions by scope of activities covered by guarantees2.5.3.3 Competitive distortions by geography; 2.5.4 Summary of empirical evidence of competitive distortions; 2.6 Government Guarantees and Risk Taking; 2.6.1 The concept of moral hazard in banking; 2.6.2 Empirical approaches based on guarantee-risk relationships; 2.6.3 Empirical findings based on guarantee-risk relationships; 2.6.4 Summary of empirical evidence of bank risk taking based on guarantee-risk relationships; 2.6.5 Empirical approaches based on risk-return relationships
- 2.6.6 Empirical findings based on risk-return relationships2.6.7 Summary of empirical evidence of bank risk taking based on risk-return relationships; 2.7 Conclusion; 3. Government Guarantees and Banking System Risk
- A Regulatory Framework from an Exposure Perspective; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Banking System Exposure from a Credit Risk Perspective; 3.2.1 Fundamentals of an exposure perspective for banking system risk; 3.2.2 Structural credit risk modeling in regulatory capital determination; 3.2.3 Application of structural credit risk models to government guarantees for banks
- 3.2.4 Credit risk components of banking system exposure3.2.4.1 Probability of distress; 3.2.4.2 Exposure at distress; 3.2.4.3 Loss given distress; 3.2.5 An exposure-based framework of principle policy choices; 3.3 Banking System Exposure from a Sovereign Portfolio Perspective; 3.3.1 Introduction to sovereign portfolio management; 3.3.2 Macroeconomic tradeoffs implied by regulatory policy choices; 3.3.3 Banking system exposure management from a portfolio perspective; 3.4 Regulatory Policy Options and Their Economic Tradeoffs; 3.4.1 Management of probability of distress