Security and privacy in smart grid /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Abdallah, Asmaa, author.
Imprint:Cham, Switzerland : Springer, 2018.
Description:1 online resource
Language:English
Series:SpringerBriefs in electrical and computer engineering, 2191-8112
SpringerBriefs in electrical and computer engineering.
Subject:Smart power grids -- Security measures.
TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING -- Mechanical.
Communications engineering -- telecommunications.
WAP (wireless) technology.
Computer security.
Computer science.
Electrical engineering.
Electronic books.
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11679057
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Shen, X. (Xuemin), 1958- author.
ISBN:9783319936772
3319936778
9783319936765
331993676X
Digital file characteristics:text file PDF
Notes:Includes bibliographical references.
Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed August 2, 2018).
Summary:This SpringerBrief addresses the main security concerns for smart grid, e.g., the privacy of electricity consumers, the exchanged messages integrity and confidentiality, the authenticity of participated parties, and the false data injection attacks. Moreover, the authors demonstrate in detail the various proposed techniques to secure the smart grid's different communication networks and preserve the privacy of the involved. Over many years, power grid has generated electricity from central generators and distributed it in one direction from the generation stations to end-users; also, information is one directional so that the grid's control center doesn't get enough information about customers' requirements and consequently can't prevent electricity losses. So, the electricity grid is merged with information and communication technology to form smart grid. The main target of this incorporation is to connect different parties of power grid to exchange information about grid conditions and customers' requirements, and consequently, improve the reliability and efficiency of electricity generation and distribution. That upgrade of the power grid exposes it to the cyber security threats that the communication networks suffer from, such as malicious attacks to forge the electricity consumption readings or price, extract personal information for residential consumers, such as daily habits and life style, or attack some grid's resources and equipment availability using denial-of-service attacks. Also, novel threats are introduced in smart grid due to the power grid nature, such as false data injection attack, in which the adversary compromises several measurement units and injects false information about the grid conditions that mislead the grid's control center to make wrong decisions for the grid and consequently impact on its stability and efficiency.
Other form:Print version: Abdallah, Asmaa. Security and privacy in smart grid. Cham, Switzerland : Springer, 2018 331993676X 9783319936765
Standard no.:10.1007/978-3-319-93677-2
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505 0 |a Intro; Preface; Acknowledgements; Contents; Acronyms; 1 Introduction; 1.1 What Is Smart Grid; 1.2 Smart Grid Security; 1.3 The Brief Objectives; 1.4 Outlines of the Brief; 2 Smart Grid Technology; 2.1 Smart Grid Benefits; 2.2 Smart Grid Architecture; 2.2.1 Smart Grid Reference Model; 2.2.2 Smart Grid Layers; 2.2.3 Smart Grid Systems; 2.3 Smart Grid Networks; 2.3.1 Home Area Networks (HANs); 2.3.2 Neighbourhood Area Networks (NANs); 2.3.3 Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) Connections; 2.3.4 Wide Area Networks (WANs); 2.4 Power Control System and State Estimation Operation; 2.5 Smart Grid Security Concerns 
505 8 |a 2.6 Summary3 Smart Grid SecuritySecurity and Privacy of Customer-Side Networks; 3.1 Customer-Side Networks Security; 3.2 Low Overhead Security and Privacy Preserving Scheme for Customer-Side Networks; 3.2.1 System Model; 3.2.1.1 Network Model; 3.2.1.2 Adversary Model; 3.2.1.3 Design Goals; 3.2.2 Preliminaries; 3.2.2.1 NTRU Cryptographic Scheme; 3.2.3 The Proposed Scheme; 3.2.3.1 Initialization Phase; 3.2.3.2 Exchange Messages Phase; 3.2.4 Security Analysis; 3.2.5 Performance Evaluation; 3.2.5.1 Communication Overhead; 3.2.5.2 Computation Complexity 
505 8 |a 3.3 Lightweight Lattice-Based Homomorphic Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation Scheme for HANs3.3.1 System Model; 3.3.1.1 Network Model; 3.3.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements; 3.3.2 Preliminaries; 3.3.3 The Proposed Scheme; 3.3.3.1 Initialization Phase; 3.3.3.2 Reading Aggregation Phase; 3.3.4 Security Analysis; 3.3.5 Performance Evaluation; 3.3.5.1 Communication Overhead; 3.3.5.2 Computation Overhead; 3.4 Summary; 4 Smart Grid Security Secure V2G Connections; 4.1 V2G Connections Security; 4.2 Lightweight Authentication and Privacy-Preserving V2G Connection Scheme 
505 8 |a 4.2.1 System Model4.2.1.1 Network Model; 4.2.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements; 4.2.2 Preliminaries; 4.2.2.1 PASSERINE Crypto-System; 4.2.3 The Proposed Scheme; 4.2.3.1 Phase 1: Initialization; 4.2.3.2 Phase 2: Operation; 4.2.3.3 Billing Phase; 4.2.4 Security Analysis; 4.2.5 Performance Evaluation; 4.2.5.1 Communication Complexity; 4.2.5.2 Computation Complexity; 4.3 Summary; 5 Smart Grid SecurityProtection Against False Data Injection (FDI) Attacks; 5.1 Power Control System and State Estimation Security; 5.2 Efficient Prevention Technique for FDI Attacks in Smart Grid 
505 8 |a 5.2.1 System Model5.2.1.1 Network Model; 5.2.1.2 Adversary Model; 5.2.2 Preliminaries; 5.2.2.1 McEliece Cryptosystem; 5.2.3 The Proposed Scheme; 5.2.3.1 Initialization Phase; 5.2.3.2 Operation Phase; 5.2.4 Security Analysis; 5.2.5 Performance Evaluation; 5.2.5.1 Communication Complexity; 5.2.5.2 Computation Complexity; 5.2.5.3 State Estimator Performance Evaluation; 5.2.6 Case Study; 5.3 Summary; 6 Conclusions and Future Work; 6.1 Conclusions; 6.2 Further Research Topics; References 
520 |a This SpringerBrief addresses the main security concerns for smart grid, e.g., the privacy of electricity consumers, the exchanged messages integrity and confidentiality, the authenticity of participated parties, and the false data injection attacks. Moreover, the authors demonstrate in detail the various proposed techniques to secure the smart grid's different communication networks and preserve the privacy of the involved. Over many years, power grid has generated electricity from central generators and distributed it in one direction from the generation stations to end-users; also, information is one directional so that the grid's control center doesn't get enough information about customers' requirements and consequently can't prevent electricity losses. So, the electricity grid is merged with information and communication technology to form smart grid. The main target of this incorporation is to connect different parties of power grid to exchange information about grid conditions and customers' requirements, and consequently, improve the reliability and efficiency of electricity generation and distribution. That upgrade of the power grid exposes it to the cyber security threats that the communication networks suffer from, such as malicious attacks to forge the electricity consumption readings or price, extract personal information for residential consumers, such as daily habits and life style, or attack some grid's resources and equipment availability using denial-of-service attacks. Also, novel threats are introduced in smart grid due to the power grid nature, such as false data injection attack, in which the adversary compromises several measurement units and injects false information about the grid conditions that mislead the grid's control center to make wrong decisions for the grid and consequently impact on its stability and efficiency. 
650 0 |a Smart power grids  |x Security measures. 
650 7 |a TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING  |x Mechanical.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a Communications engineering  |x telecommunications.  |2 bicssc 
650 7 |a WAP (wireless) technology.  |2 bicssc 
650 7 |a Computer security.  |2 bicssc 
650 7 |a Computer science.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00872451 
650 7 |a Electrical engineering.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01728596 
655 4 |a Electronic books. 
700 1 |a Shen, X.  |q (Xuemin),  |d 1958-  |e author.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n89129449 
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