Economic analysis of contract law : incomplete contracts and asymmetric information /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Bag, Sugata, author.
Imprint:Cham, Switzerland : Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
Description:1 online resource
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11544148
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9783319652689
3319652680
9783319652672
3319652672
Digital file characteristics:text file
PDF
Notes:Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed February 7, 2018).
Summary:This book examines the main issues arising in economic analysis of contract law with special attention given to the incomplete contracts. It discusses both the main features of contract law as they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how the relevant legal rules and the institutions can be analysed from an economic perspective. Evaluate the welfare impacts, analyses the effects and the desirability of different breach remedies and examines the optimal incentive structure of party-designed liquidated damages under the different dimensions of informational asymmetry. Overall the book aims to contribute to the legal debate over the adoption of the specific breach remedies when the breach victim's expectation interest is difficult to assess, and to the debate over courts' reluctance to implement large penalties in the event of breach of contracts.
Other form:Print version : 3319652672 9783319652672
Standard no.:10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9