Philosophical essays. Volume 2, The philosophical significance of language /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Soames, Scott.
Imprint:Princeton : Princeton University Press, ©2009.
Description:1 online resource (x, 461 pages)
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11212364
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Varying Form of Title:Philosophical significance of language
ISBN:9781400833184
1400833183
9780691136820
0691136823
0691136831
9780691136837
1282531441
9781282531444
9780691136837
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Print version record.
Summary:The two volumes of Philosophical Essays bring together the most important essays written by one of the world's foremost philosophers of language. Scott Soames has selected thirty-one essays spanning nearly three decades of thinking about linguistic meaning and the philosophical significance of language. A judicious collection of old and new, these volumes include sixteen essays published in the 1980s and 1990s, nine published since 2000, and six new essays. The essays in Volume 1 investigate what linguistic meaning is; how the meaning of a sentence is related to the use we mak.
Other form:Print version: Soames, Scott. Philosophical essays. Princeton : Princeton University Press, ©2009- 9780691136837
Table of Contents:
  • The Origins of These Essays
  • Introduction
  • Part 1. Reference, Propositions, and Propositional Attitudes
  • Essay 1. Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content
  • Essay 2. Why Propositions Can't Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances
  • Essay 3. Belief and Mental Representation
  • Essay 4. Attitudes and Anaphora
  • Part 2. Modality
  • Essay 5. The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions
  • Essay 6. The Philosophical Significance of the Kripkean Necessary A Posteriori
  • Essay 7. Knowledge of Manifest Natural Kinds
  • Essay 8. Understanding Assertion
  • Essay 9. Ambitious Two-Dimensionalism
  • Essay 10. Actually
  • Part 3. Truth and Vagueness
  • Essay 11. What Is a Theory of Truth?
  • Essay 12. Understanding Deflationism
  • Essay 13. Higher-Order Vagueness for Partially Defined Predicates
  • Essay 14. The Possibility of Partial Definition
  • Part 4. Kripke, Wittgenstein, and Following a Rule
  • Essay 15. Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox
  • Essay 16. Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox
  • Index