Fool me twice : intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism /

Fool me twice : intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Copeland, Thomas E.
Imprint:Leiden ; Boston : Martinus Nijhoff, ©2007.
Description:1 online resource (xxv, 292 pages)
Language:English
Subject:
Intelligence service -- United States -- Evaluation.
Terrorism -- Prevention.
Bombings.
Bombings.
Intelligence service -- Evaluation.
Terrorism -- Prevention.
United States.
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11206480
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9789047440291
9047440293
1282601970
9781282601970
9786612601972
6612601973
9789004158450
9004158456
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 275-288) and index.
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
Summary:Evaluates whether surprise and intelligence failure leading to mass casualty terrorism are inevitable. This book features a study that explores the extent to which four factors - failures of public policy leadership, analytical challenges, organizational obstacles, and inherent problems of warning information - contribute to intelligence failure.
Other form:Print version: Copeland, Thomas E. Fool me twice. Leiden ; Boston : Martinus Nijhoff, ©2007 9789004158450
Standard no.:10.1163/ej.9789004158450.i-292
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Dedication
  • Table of Contents
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgements
  • About the Author
  • List of Abbreviations
  • Chapter 1
  • Introduction
  • A. Key Concepts: Strategic Surprise and Intelligence Failure
  • 1. Strategic Surprise
  • 2. Intelligence Failure
  • B. The "New Terrorism"
  • 1. Qualitative and Quantitative Changes in the Terrorist Threat
  • 2. The Challenge to Government
  • C. Sources of Intelligence Failure
  • 1. Leadership and Policy Failures
  • 2. Organizational and Bureaucratic Issues
  • 3. Problems with Warning Information
  • 4. Analytical Challenges
  • D. Understanding Mass Casualty Terrorism, 1993-2001
  • Chapter 2
  • February 26, 1993: The World Trade Center
  • A. Introduction
  • 1. The Streets of New York
  • 2. The First Big Surprise
  • B. Leadership Failures
  • 1. Psychology, Perception and the Threat Environment
  • 2. Setting Priorities for Intelligence Collection
  • 3. Failures of Public Policy Leadership
  • C. Organizational Obstacles
  • 1. Obstacle #1: FBI Culture and Confidential Informants
  • 2. Obstacle #2: Federal-State Coordination
  • 3. Obstacle #3: FBI-CIA TurfWars
  • 4. Obstacle #4: FBI Investigations vs. Intelligence
  • 5. Obstacle #5: Executive and Legislative Restrictions
  • D. Threat and Warning Information
  • 1. Threat Indicators-Hiding in Plain Sight
  • 2. Warning Indicators-Signals vs. Noise
  • 3. Missed Opportunities
  • E. Analytical Challenges
  • F. The First Avoidable Surprise?
  • G. Conclusion
  • Chapter 3
  • April; 19, 1995: Oklahoma City
  • A. Introduction
  • 1. What Was the Nature of the Surprise?
  • B. Leadership Failures
  • 1. Psychology, Perception, and the Threat Environment
  • 2. The Perceived Threat Environment
  • 3. Failures of Public Policy Leadership
  • C. Organizational Obstacles
  • 1. The First Amendment and Domestic Surveillance
  • 2. Law Enforcement Culture and Attitudes
  • 3. Law Enforcement Coordination
  • D. Threat and Warning Information
  • 1. The Threat from the Far Right
  • 2. Specific Warning Indicators
  • 3. Possible Indicators from "Others Unknown"
  • 4. No Warning
  • 5. Failing to Learn
  • E. Analytical Challenges
  • F. Conclusion
  • Chapter 4
  • June 25, 1996: Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia
  • A. Introduction
  • 1. The U.S. Mission in the Persian Gulf
  • 2. The First Signs of Trouble: 1994-95
  • 3. Heightened Security at U.S. Installations
  • 4. What Was the Nature of the Surprise at Khobar Towers?
  • 5. Competing Judgments on the Failure
  • B. Leadership Failures
  • 1. The Perceived Threat Environment in Saudi Arabia Prior to
  • November 1995
  • 2. Perceptions of Threat After OPM/SANG
  • 3. The Charge of "Mission Creep"
  • 4. Efforts to Enhance Force Protection
  • 5. Sensitivity to Host Country Concerns
  • 6. Failures of Public Policy Leadership
  • C. Organizational Obstacles
  • 1. For Lack of a SOFA
  • 2. Structure of the Military Chain of Command
  • 3. Lack of Guidance from DOD
  • 4. Money and Manpower
  • 5. Conclusions on Organizational Obstacles
  • D. Threat and Warning Information
  • 1. Threat Indicators in the Kingdom
  • 2. Warning Indicators
  • 3. Conclusions on Threat and Warning
  • E. Analytical Challenges
  • 1. The Lack of Human Intelligence
  • F. Conclusion
  • 1. The Fina.

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