Wittgenstein's account of truth /
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Author / Creator: | Ellenbogen, Sara. |
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Imprint: | Albany : State University of New York Press, ©2003. |
Description: | 1 online resource (xv, 148 pages) |
Language: | English |
Series: | SUNY series in philosophy SUNY series in philosophy. |
Subject: | Wittgenstein, Ludwig, -- 1889-1951. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, -- 1889-1951 Truth. PHILOSOPHY -- Epistemology. Truth. Electronic books. Electronic books. |
Format: | E-Resource Book |
URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11129171 |
Table of Contents:
- Machine generated contents note: pt. I From "Meaning Is Use" to the Rejection of Transcendent Truth
- 1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism
- 2. Positive Account of Truth
- 3. Antirealism Revisited
- pt. II From "Meaning Is Use" To Semantic Antirealism
- 4. Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion
- 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism
- 6. Tensions Between Wittgenstein and Dummett
- 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent
- pt. III Why A Revisionist Account Of Truth?
- 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions
- 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions
- 10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible
- 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth
- 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth?