Representing reason /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Koziolek, Nicholas Paul, author.
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2015
Description:1 electronic resource (264 pages)
Format: E-Resource Dissertations
Local Note:School code: 0330
URL for this record:
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:University of Chicago. degree granting institution.
Notes:Advisors: Michael Kremer Committee members: Marko Malink; Josef Stern; Malte Willer.
Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-02(E), Section: A.
Summary:This dissertation is centrally concerned with our ability to represent one another's reasoning. The project is motivated by the thought that, in representing another thinker as performing an act of reasoning----for example, as coming to believe something on the basis of something else she already believes----you yourself perform the very same piece of reasoning you represent her as having performed (though without necessarily endorsing either the premises or the conclusion). This motivating thought rests, however, on the weaker claim that, in representing another thinker as, say, believing something, you yourself think the very same thought you represent her as believing. Building on the work of Gareth Evans, I develop a neo-Fregean theory of thoughts about thoughts that can respect the latter claim, defending it, along the way, from important challenges posed by Tyler Burge, Saul Kripke, and others.