Quadratic election law /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Posner, Eric A., author.
Imprint:[Chicago, Illinois] : Law School, University of Chicago, 2016.
Description:1 online resource (21 pages)
Series:Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics working paper ; no. 752
Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics working paper ; no. 752.
Subject:Election law -- United States.
Voting -- United States.
Decision making -- United States.
Decision making.
Election law.
United States.
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10601509
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Stephanopoulos, Nicholas, author.
Notes:"March 2016."
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from online title page (viewed April 22, 2016).
Summary:"The standard form of electoral system in the United States - plurality voting with one person, one vote - suffers from countless defects, most of which stem from its failure to enable people to register the intensity of their preferences for political outcomes when they vote. Quadratic voting, an elegant alternative system proposed by Glen Weyl, provides a theoretically attractive solution to this problem but is an awkward fit with America's legal and political traditions. We identify the legal barriers to the adoption of quadratic voting, discuss modified versions that could pass muster, and show how even a modified version would address many of the pathologies of the existing system."
Item Description:"March 2016."
Physical Description:1 online resource (21 pages)
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references.