The practitioner's guide to antitrust in China /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Koblitz, Becky Nao, author.
Imprint:Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands : Wolters Kluwer Law & Business : Kluwer Law International, ©2015.
Description:xv, 220 pages ; 25 cm
Language:English
Subject:Antitrust law -- China.
Antitrust law.
China.
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10533188
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Varying Form of Title:Antitrust in China
ISBN:9789041161383
9041161384
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of Contents:
  • About the Author
  • Foreword
  • Preface
  • Chapter 1. Introduction
  • §1.01. Background
  • §1.02. The Origins of Antitrust Law and Chinese Antitrust Law
  • Chapter 2. Enforcement Framework of China's Antitrust Law
  • §2.01
  • A. Purpose
  • B. Who Does This Apply to? Who Is Exempt?
  • C. What Is the Jurisdiction of the AML?
  • D. What Is Prohibited?
  • 1. Agreements among Competitors and within the Supply Chain That Restrict or Eliminate Competition
  • 2. Using a Dominant Position in a Market to Restrict or Eliminate Competition (Commonly Known as Monopolization)
  • 3. Transactions That Have the Potential to Restrict or Eliminate Competition
  • 4. Using a Government Administrative Organ to Restrict or Eliminate Competition
  • E. What Is the Statute of Limitations for Enforcing a Violation?
  • F. What Are the Penalties for Violating AML? The Violation of AML May Lead to Administrative Liability, Criminal Liability and/or Civil Liability
  • 1. Administrative Liability
  • 2. Criminal Liability
  • 3. Civil Damages Liability
  • §2.02. Who Enforces the Antitrust Laws?
  • A. 1Government Agencies
  • B. 1Private Parties (Private Lawsuits in the Courts)
  • 1. Standing: Who Can File Antitrust Complaints?
  • 2. Jurisdiction of the Courts: In Which Courts Can Antitrust Suits Be Filed?
  • 3. Does There First Need to Be a Government Investigation before a Private Action Can Be Filed?
  • 4. What Is the Statute of Limitations for Filing an Antitrust Claim?
  • 5. Statute of Limitations for Calculating Damages
  • §2.03. Procedure: How Does the Government Enforce the AML?
  • A. Investigations
  • 1. Flow Does the Government Get Information to Start an Investigation? How Are Investigations Initiated?
  • 2. What Is the Investigation Procedure?
  • 3. What Are the Investigated Parties' Obligations?
  • 4. What Are the Investigated Parties' Rights?
  • 5. Are Decisions Published?
  • B. Review of Premerger Filings: Procedures
  • 1. Not All Transactions Have to Be Reported: Which Transactions Must Be Reported?
  • a. The "Critical Mass" Threshold
  • b. "Suitability" Definition
  • c. Joint Ventures
  • d. Transactions That Do Not Have to Be Reported for Premerger Notification
  • 2. Two Filing Procedures: Simple and Normal
  • a. Simplified Premerger Filing Process
  • b. Normal Premerger Filing Process
  • c. Discussion about Pros and Cons of the Two Premerger Review Processes
  • 3. What Rights of Appeal Do Companies Have?
  • §2.04. Procedural Issues Related to Private Antitrust Actions
  • A. Burden of Proof
  • B. Evidence
  • C. Statements Obtained during Leniency Negotiations
  • D. Calculation of Damages
  • §2.05. Concluding Remarks for Chapter 2
  • Chapter 3. Interaction with Competitors
  • §3.01. Background: General Antitrust Concepts Related to Relationships with Competitors
  • §3.02. Prohibitions under the Anti-Monopoly Law
  • A. Explicit Agreements and Agreements Inferred from Conduct
  • B. Unique Situation in China
  • 1. Joint Ventures as Competitors
  • 2. Industry Associations Request Information
  • C. "Per Se" or "Hard Core" Is Inferred through Exemptions
  • §3.03. Enforcement
  • A. Government Investigations
  • B. Types of Conduct That Violate the AML
  • C. Penalties and Leniency Program under the AML
  • §3.04. Putting Things in Perspective
  • A. Preliminary View of the Industry
  • B. Identify Areas of Potential Antitrust Risk through Internal Audit
  • C. Potential Risk
  • D. Know What Local Staff Is Doing
  • Chapter 4. Conduct within the Supply Chain: Resale Price Maintenance
  • §4.01. Background
  • A. Vertical Restraints
  • B. Vertical Restraints under the AML
  • §4.02. Resale Price Maintenance
  • A. Methods of Analysis
  • 1. Rule of Reason
  • 2. Inherently Illegal: Prohibition in Principle but with Exemptions
  • §4.03. Government Investigations Involving RPM
  • A. Assessing Impact on Competition in the Relevant Market
  • B. Types of Conduct That Could Violate the AML
  • C. Penalties and Leniency Program under the AML
  • §4.04. Civil Action Involving RPM
  • A. Burden of Proof
  • B. Importance of Economic Analysis
  • C. Standing to Sue
  • D. Perspectives on Admissibility and Weight of Evidence
  • E. Calculation of Damages
  • F. Economic Analysis and Antitrust Legal Analysis Complement Each Other
  • §4.05. Putting Things in Perspective
  • A. Preliminary View of the Industry
  • B. Identify Areas of Potential Antitrust Risk whether or Not There Is a Risk of Concrete Investigation
  • C. Potential Risk
  • D. Motivation behind Government RPM Investigations
  • Chapter 5. Conduct within the Supply Chain-Monopolization
  • §5.01. Background
  • A. Monopolization in General
  • B. Monopolization under the AML
  • 1. Relevant Market: Substitution Analysis
  • 2. Relevant Market: Hypothetical Monopolist Test
  • C. Dominant Market Position
  • D. Excessive Prices
  • §5.02. Government Investigations
  • A. NDRC
  • 1. InterDigital
  • 2. Quakomm
  • B. SAIC
  • C. Relevant Market
  • D. Conditional Pricing
  • E. Outcome of Investigations
  • §5.03. Civil Cases
  • A. Background
  • B. Economic Analysis
  • C. Exclusive Dealing
  • D. Tying
  • §5.04. Putting Things in Perspective
  • A. Preliminary View of the Industry
  • B. Dentify Areas of Potential Risk through Internal Antitrust Audits
  • Economic Analysis
  • Examples for Hypothetical Bundled Discounts
  • Potential Antitrust Risk: Early Resolution
  • Chapter 6. Merger Review
  • §6.01. Background
  • A. Enforcement Agency Responsible for Merger Review: Ministry of Commerce
  • B. Underlying Concepts of Merger Review
  • 1. Relevant Market
  • a. Substitutability
  • b. Hypothetical Monopolist Test
  • 2. Potential Harm
  • a. Unilateral Effect
  • b. Coordinated Effect
  • c. Limiting Access
  • 3. Factors to Consider When Assessing Potential Impact of a Merger
  • C. Tools for Analysis
  • 1. Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index
  • 2. Margin-HHI Regression
  • 3. Illustrative Price Rise
  • §6.02. Issues to Consider When Contemplating a Merger Involving China
  • A. Could the Merger Affect the Supply of Raw Materials?
  • B. Does the Merger Involve Intellectual Property and High Technology?
  • C. Does the Merger Involve Other Industries Important to China's Industrial Policies Such as the Automobile, Pharmaceuticals, Health, Telecommunication and Shipping Industries?
  • D. Does the Merger Have Assets outside of China That Could Potentially Be of Interest to MOFCOM?
  • E. Does the Merger Exclude Assets That Might Have an Impact on China?
  • F. Do Not Put Your Hopes on Efficiencies
  • G. The Perfect Storm
  • §6.03. Remedies: Prohibitions in Disguise
  • §6.04. Putting Things in Perspective
  • Chapter 7. Intellectual Property
  • §7.01. Background
  • A. Intellectual Property Rights in General
  • B. 1PR and Antitrust Law
  • C. Intellectual Property Law in China
  • §7.02. IPR and Antitrust in China under the AML
  • A. AML
  • B. SAIC Rules
  • C. AML and the Patent Law
  • D. Other Legislation
  • §7.03. How IPR Have Been Dealt with When the AML Is Enforced
  • A. MOFCOM
  • B. Civil Action: Huawei v. InterDigital
  • C. Government Investigations
  • 1. InterDigital
  • 2. Qualcomm
  • §7.04. Putting Things in Perspective
  • Chapter 8. Abuse of Administrative Power
  • §8.01. Background
  • §8.02. Not Only Government Action but Anticompetitive Conduct of Companies
  • §8.03. Enforcement through administrative Decisions or Judicial Decisions
  • A. Administrative
  • B. Judicial
  • §8.04. Putting Things in Perspective
  • Appendix I. Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China [Effective]
  • Appendix II. Provisions of the State Council on the Standard for Declaration of Concentration of Business Operators
  • Appendix III. Lists of Practical Tips
  • A. Practical Tips Related to Investigations
  • B. Practical Tips for Proactive Antitrust Compliance (Whether or Not There Is a Concrete Threat of Investigations)
  • Appendix IV. Summaries of MOFCOM Decisions
  • Index