Unquantified benefits and Bayesian cost-benefit analysis /

"As the last act of its 2014-2015 term, the Supreme Court struck down a major EPA regulation limiting mercury emissions from electrical power plants. The formal legal reason was EPA's failure to consider the costs of regulating mercury before deciding that it must be regulated. But the cos...

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Masur, Jonathan S., author.
Imprint:[Chicago, Illinois] : Law School, University of Chicago, 2015.
Description:1 online resource (51 pages)
Language:English
Series:Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics working paper ; no. 730 (2d series)
Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 538
Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics working paper ; no. 730.
Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 538.
Subject:Cost effectiveness.
Environmental law -- Compliance costs -- United States.
Trade regulation -- United States -- Cost effectiveness.
Bayesian statistical decision theory.
Bayesian statistical decision theory.
Cost effectiveness.
Environmental law -- Compliance costs.
Trade regulation -- Cost effectiveness.
United States.
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10364587
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Posner, Eric A., author.
Notes:"August 2015."
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from online title page (viewed September 30, 2015).
Summary:"As the last act of its 2014-2015 term, the Supreme Court struck down a major EPA regulation limiting mercury emissions from electrical power plants. The formal legal reason was EPA's failure to consider the costs of regulating mercury before deciding that it must be regulated. But the costs of the regulation - 9.6 billion dollars - would not have attracted such attention if they had not seemed so disproportionate to the regulatory benefits. The only mercury-related benefits that EPA could measure and include in its analysis related to the possibility that mercury exposure would slightly reduce the IQ of the children born to women who consumed fish high in mercury while pregnant. Against 9.6 billion dollars in costs, EPA calculated only 5 million dollars in benefits - a ratio of 1,920 to 1. The imbalance in this ratio had a significant impact upon the court. As Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in Michigan v. EPA, "One would not say that it is even rational, never mind 'appropriate,' to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits."
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