Bibliographic Details

Distributionally-weighted cost benefit analysis : welfare economics meets organizational design / David A. Weisbach.

Author / Creator Weisbach, David A., author.
Imprint [Chicago, Illinois] : Law School, University of Chicago, 2014.
Description 1 online resource (48 pages)
Language English
Series Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics working paper ; no. 689 (2d series)
Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 478
Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics working paper ; no. 689.
Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 478.
Subject Cost effectiveness.
Administrative agencies -- Economic aspects -- United States.
Distributive justice -- United States.
Welfare economics.
Cost effectiveness.
Distributive justice.
Welfare economics.
United States.
Format E-Resource, Book
URL for this record http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10082638
Other authors / contributors Porat, Ariel, author.
Notes "Draft of July 7, 2014."
Includes bibliographical references.
Summary "Conventional approaches to cost benefit analysis, derived from social welfare maximization, suggest that it should ideally be adjusted to account for distributional effects. These approaches do not consider how tasks should be assigned within a large institution that includes specialized units such as the numerous agencies in the federal government. This paper considers how optimal distributive systems map onto the assignment of tasks to government agencies in such a system. It concludes that regulatory agencies should not, in general be asked to consider the distributive effects of regulations. The types of distributive adjustments that specialized regulatory agencies are able to make are not consistent with the types of distributive polices that are desirable. As a result, attempts to adjust cost-benefit analysis for distributive effects will likely be more expensive and less effective than other means of improving the distribution of resources. Instead, regulatory agencies, particularly those correcting market failures, should use cost-benefit analysis without taking distributive effects into account."
LEADER 03703cam a2200493 i 4500
001 10082638
003 ICU
005 20190123103114.0
006 m o d
007 cr b||||||||||
008 140929s2014 ilu ob 000 0 eng c
040 |a CGU  |b eng  |e rda  |c CGU  |d OCLCF  |d CGU 
035 |a (OCoLC)891593813 
042 |a pcc 
043 |a n-us--- 
050 4 |a HD47.4  |b .W45 2014 
049 |a CGUA 
100 1 |a Weisbach, David A.,  |e author.  |1 http://isni.org/isni/0000000083364598  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no99073895  |1 http://viaf.org/viaf/119925683 
245 1 0 |a Distributionally-weighted cost benefit analysis :  |b welfare economics meets organizational design /  |c David A. Weisbach. 
264 1 |a [Chicago, Illinois] :  |b Law School, University of Chicago,  |c 2014. 
300 |a 1 online resource (48 pages) 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent  |0 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/contentTypes/txt 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia  |0 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/mediaTypes/c 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier  |0 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/carriers/cr 
490 1 |a Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics working paper ;  |v no. 689 (2d series) 
490 1 |a Public law and legal theory working paper ;  |v no. 478 
500 |a "Draft of July 7, 2014." 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references. 
520 |a "Conventional approaches to cost benefit analysis, derived from social welfare maximization, suggest that it should ideally be adjusted to account for distributional effects. These approaches do not consider how tasks should be assigned within a large institution that includes specialized units such as the numerous agencies in the federal government. This paper considers how optimal distributive systems map onto the assignment of tasks to government agencies in such a system. It concludes that regulatory agencies should not, in general be asked to consider the distributive effects of regulations. The types of distributive adjustments that specialized regulatory agencies are able to make are not consistent with the types of distributive polices that are desirable. As a result, attempts to adjust cost-benefit analysis for distributive effects will likely be more expensive and less effective than other means of improving the distribution of resources. Instead, regulatory agencies, particularly those correcting market failures, should use cost-benefit analysis without taking distributive effects into account." 
650 0 |a Cost effectiveness.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033197 
650 0 |a Administrative agencies  |x Economic aspects  |z United States. 
650 0 |a Distributive justice  |z United States.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2009123565 
650 0 |a Welfare economics.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85146027 
650 7 |a Cost effectiveness.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00880707 
650 7 |a Distributive justice.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00895621 
650 7 |a Welfare economics.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01173620 
651 7 |a United States.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01204155 
700 1 |a Porat, Ariel,  |e author.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/nr98025716  |1 http://viaf.org/viaf/14684022 
830 0 |a Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics working paper ;  |v no. 689. 
830 0 |a Public law and legal theory working paper ;  |v no. 478. 
856 4 0 |u http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2366&context=law_and_economics 
856 4 0 |u http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2450142 
903 |a HeVa  |b 20200715 
928 |u http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2366&context=law_and_economics  |c FullText  |l Online  |t LCC  |a HD47.4 .W45 2014